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Macroeconomic Policies in the OECD
and LDC External Adjustment
ABSTRACT
In this paper, the authors describe a simulation model for analyzing the
effects of macroeconomic policies in the OECD on global macroeconomic
equilibrium. Particular attention is paid to the effects on developing
countries of alternative mixes of monetary and fiscal policies in the OECD.
Though the model is quite small, it has several properties which make it
attractive for policy analysis. First, the important stock-flow relationships
and intertemporal budget constraints are carefully observed, so that the model
is useful for short—run and long—run analysis. Budget deficits, for example,
cumulate into a stock of public debt which must be serviced, while current
account deficits cumulate into a stock of foreign debt. Second, the asset
markets are forward looking, so that the exchange rate is conditioned by the
entire future path of policies rather than by a set of short-run expectations.
Third, the model is amenable to policy optimization exercises, and in particular
can be used to study the effects of policy coordination versus non-coordination







Macroeconomic Policies in the OECD and
LDC External kdjustment
This paper describes a simulation model for analyzing the effects of
macroeconomic policies in the OECD on global macroeconomic equilibrium.
Particular attention is paid to the effects on developing countries of
alternative mixes of monetary and fiscal policies in the OECD. Though the model
is quite small, it has several properties which make it attractive for policy
analysis. First, the important stock—flow relationships and intertemporal
budget constraints are carefully observed, so that the model is useful for
short—run and long—run analysis. Budget deficits, for example, cumulate into a
stock of public debt which must be serviced, while current account deficits
cumulate into a stock of foreign debt. Second, the asset markets are forward
looking, so that the exchange rate is conditioned by the entire future path of
policies rather than by a set of short—run expectations. Third, the model is
amenable to policy optimization exercises, and in particular can be used to
study the effects of policy coordination versus non—coordination in the OECD, on
global macroeconomic equilibrium.
In Section I of this paper, the model is described in detail, and the basic
numerical parameterization is also set out. Section lIt presents various policy
multipliers, for fiscal and monetary impulses in the U.S. and the rest of the
OECD. In Section III, we show how optimizing policies in the OECD will differ
depending on the degree of macroeconomic policy coordination between the U.S.
and the rest of the OECD. The developing countries are shown to be quite
strongly affected by the absence of effective policy coordination among the—2—
developedeconomies. Section IVtreatsthe welfare implications of OECD
policies for the developing countries. We distinguish appropriate welfare
measurements from simpler 'out commonly used measures involving LDC exports to
the OECD. In Section V we present an historical simulation exercise which
examines the implicatons of coordinated policy in response to the 1919 OPEC oil
price shock. Section VI examines the impact of a shift in the U.S.
monetary/fiscal mix (commencing in l984) towards smaller fiscal deficits and




The model is for a four—region division of the world economy: the U.S.,
the rest of the OECD (hereafter denoted OECD), OPEC and the non—oil developing
countries (hereafter denoted LDCs). t this point, only the developed country
bloc has an internal macroeconomic structure; the non—oil L]DCs and OPEC blocs
embrace only the foreign trade aspects of these economies. Thus, while we can
measure the effects of U.S. policies on LDC exports, we do not yet attempt to
study the effects of LDC exports on internal macroeconomic equilibrium in the
LDCs.
Each region produces a single output, which is an imperfect substitute in
consumption for the outputs of the other regions. Thus, each region consumes
the outputs of the other three, with relative consumption demands depending on the
relative prices of the three goods. The notation C will signify the quantity—3--
of consumption by country i of the output of country j. Superscripts and
subscripts U, 0, P and L signify the U.S., OECD, OPEC and the LDCs,
respectively. The trade matrix linking the four regions is given in Table 1.
Table 1: Trade Matrix
Exports








We assume that growth of potential GDP in the U.S. and OECD is at a
constant rate of n percent per year (n =3%in the simulations that follow).
All quantities, such as actual GDP (Q) or exports (C) are defined per unit of
potential GDP. We adopt the normalization that potential GDP in the U.S.
equals 1.0, and that all prices are 1.0 in the baseline (this fixes the values
of the remaining quantities). Thus, the same values of C in years t and t+l
signify an actual quantity of exports that is growing at the rate n. Similarly,
the level of GDP in the U.S. (QU) is per unit of potential GDP, so that Q =.9
for example, signifies a 10% output gap relative to potential in any year t.
In the U.S. and OECD, output is demand determined along conventional lines.-t -
Inany period, the nominal wage (we) is predetermined, and domestic prices
are a fixed markup over the wage. Consumer prices are a geometric weighted
average of domestic and foreign prices, with weights equal to initial
expenditure shares. Thus, in the U.S., we have:
(1) cu =pUl(POE)2(PL)3(PP)l23
(where no ambiguity will result, we drop the time subscript for period t). Here
P0 is the OECD output price in the localcurrency (the "ECU" for convenience),
and E is the nominal exchange rate, in $/ECU. F" is the $-.price of LDC
output and PP is the $—price of OPEC output (i.e. oil). Note that while
is predetermined in period t, Pis not, since any ofPand P may change
in period t.
ggregate demand is the sum of private domestic absorption (D), exports net
of imports, and government spending. Note that and are defined in real
units of the national good. From our earlier notation, IJ.S. export quantities
0 L P
are (C ++ ce),and the real value of imports in terms of U.S. goods is
r(POE/Pu)Cg +(pL/PU)C
+(P)/PU)C].Henceforth, we define the U.S. real
exchange rate vis—a—vis the OECD as A° =(pOE/PU)the real price of LDC
L LU P PU goods as A =P/F ,andthe real price of OPEC oil as A =PIF.Combining
all of the demand components we have that aggregate demand is:





Private absorption is written as a linear function of GDP net of total taxes T,
the real interest rate r, and financial wealth, H:
U UU U U
(3) D =(l—s)(Q—T )— yr+6HThere are counterpart equations for aggregate demand and absorption in the OECD.
Note that current absorption is written as a function of current disposable
income rather than permanent income. This specification of course builds in a
strong anti—Ricardian presumption that the time path of taxes affects the time
path of private absorption, even for a given discounted value of the tax burden.
Alternative specifications, such as in Blanchard (l98)-), would allow for a
partial dependence of the absorption path on the path of taxes.
The real interest rate in (3) is the own—rate on U.S. goods. Letting
be the nominal interest rate, we have:
U U U UU =r
+
U In principal, the equation should have the ex ante expectation of rather
than its realization, but as we will proceed in a model without uncertainty and
with perfect foresight, we assume (÷1)E =P÷1.Let denote
and denote the CPI inflation, (1—p')/p. We assume that nominal wage
change (w1—w)/w is a function of TrU, Q, and the change in (remember that
is output relative to potential output), with (W1—W)/w = +QU
÷ T(Q_Q1). Next, by the assumption of a fixed price markup over wages, so
that domestic price change equals wage change, we write:
U CU U U U = + + T(QtQti)
The wealth term H in (3) comprises financial wealth of the private sector.
Here we make some strong portfolio assumptions to simplify the model. U.S.
residents hold two types of claims: U.S. $—denominated government debt and—6—
$—denominated loans to the LDCs. U.S. residents hold no OECD assets. OECD
residents hold three types of assets: U.S. $—denominated claims on U.S.
residents, OECD ECU—denominated government debt, and ECU—denominated claims on
the LDCs. OPEC holds $—denominated claims on the U.S., OECD and LDCs. Both the
U.S. and OECI) governments hold official claims on the LDCs which are issued at
concessional rates. As with the consumption of various country outputs, it is
convenient to adopt the following notation for each country's holding of the
other country's assets. All asset stocks are defined in real terms, with B°,
and A in units of OECD goods, and all the rest in real U.S. $.Ais the
stock of claims on U.S. residents, held by the OECD. Similarly, is the stock
of claims on U.S. residents held by OPEC and A is the stock of claims on LDCs
held by U.S. residents. Let BU be the outstanding stock of U.S. government debt
(where each asset is per unit of U.S. potential GDP). Note that as an
accounting matter all BU is held in the U.S., but since A and A are perfect
Table 2: Matrix of Asset Holdings
Claim held by
US OECD OPEC
Claim on private official private official private official
US private _U
- -
official B — — — —
OECDprivate _O
- A official B — —
OPEC
LDCs A BA B
substitutes for EU, the assumption is not restrictive (i.e. the model behaves as—7—
if the OECD and OPEC hold claims on the U.S. government as well as the U.S.
private sector). Table 2 shows the matrix of asset stocks. Wealth of U.S.
residents is then =BU+A
—
Ag
—A,and for OECD residents
H°=B°+(Ag/A°) +A
—(A/A0).(Note that J-1 is in units of OECD goods.)
There are two limitations to this specification. Importantly, equity wealth is
ignored (a proper treatment of equity wealth, as in Sachs (1983), would involve
a substantial increase in complexity of the model). Second. real high—powered
money balances are also not counted as part of wealth. This change would be
easy to make but would probably not cause any major quantitative change to the
model.
Let DEF be the inflation—adjusted fiscal deficit (relative to potential GDP):
(6) DEFU =GU+rBu-TU-
VUB
Here, BL is official holdings of claims on LDCs and v is the (concessional)
real rate of interest on these assets. (Note that the standard deficitmeasure
would include nominal interest payments, 1BU, rather than real interest
payments, rBU. DEF improves upon the standard measure by being directly related
tothe change in the real value of the government's debt.) The change in




The term 1 +narises since B ismeasured relative to potential GDP, which grows
atthe rate n. We assume that v adjusts slowly to a given fraction of rU,
according to the equationv =a.v1
+b.r.This equationwas estimated
using interestrate data calculated from the average terms of official and
privatedebt (World Debt Tables, p. 2). The result was—8—
=.82V +.13r R =.15 t(35)t1 (12)t
wheret—statistics are given in parentheses. This implies that in the steady
state v =.72r,i.e. the concessional interest rate is 72 percent of the market
rate.
It remains to specify the import demand functions for the economy. Imports
are written as proportional to national absorption (DU+GU), and as a negative
function of the relative import price. In particular, we assume an elasticity
of demand of —1.5 for the OECD good, —1.0 for the LDC good and —.2 for the OPEC
good.
(8) =
U U U L-1.O
CL = +G)(A
U U U P-O.2 = -i-G)(A





0 0 0P 0—0.2 =ct5(D -fG )(A /A
Note that AL/AO =PL/EPOwhich is the price of the LDC good relative to the
OECD commodity, and is the price of the OPEC good relative to the OECD
commodity.
The final equation for the U.S. economy is the money demand equation, which
is written in standard transactions demand form:—9—
(10) MU/PU =
.U. . - U U Note that i,isthe nominal $interestrate, equal to r +
Thestructural equations for the OECD are in almost all respects the same
as for the U.S. The major exception is the portfolio block, since OECD
residents hold U.S. assets while U.S. residents do not hold OECD assets. We
assume that $—denominated assets and ECU—denominated assets are imperfect
substitutes in the OECD portfolio, and that H° =0+(A/A0)
+ —(A/A0)
is divided between ECU assets (B0+A) and net dollar assets
based on relative asset returns. The dollar return to the OECD asset is
+(Et+1_Et)/E,and the dollar return to the U.S. asset is i, so that
the return differential is i —i0—(Et+1_Et)/Et.This differential may









0 is the marginal propensity to hold $assetsout of financial wealth, and 0
measuresthe degree of asset substitutability between $andECU assets.
Note that as a ÷, theassets become perfect substitutes, with
U 0 0 00 =r
+(At+1_A)/A.
We allow for multilateral financing of current account imbalances. The







Note that as in the case of the government budget, the current account balance
is defined using real interest rates, so that CP is linked to the change in real—10—
asset stocks. The balance of payments identity requires that CA° be financed by






Wemake several simplifying assumptions to determine the change in each asset
stock. For the official loans to LDCs from both the U.S. and OECD, (4,4),we
assume a constant path per unit of potential U.S. GDP (i.e. a growth of 3% per
period in the stock of official debt). In addition we allow for some deviation





Wealso assume that the change in LDC debt held by private agents in the
OECD is a constant proportion of the flow supply of new LDC debt. In other
words, LDC debt is financed in fixed proportions by the U.S., the OECD and OPEC.
The proportion financed by each region is determined by the share of each region
in the total stock of LDC debt in the initial steady state. Therefore the







Clearly,a proportion a1 of the LDC current account deficit (net of official
flows) is financed by ECU loans, a proportiona9 by OPEC loans, and the rest
(1—a1—a2) by U.S. resident loans. Remember that the (1+n) arises because the—11—
assets stocks are measured per unit of potential GDP, whichgrows at the rate n.
The remaining equations detail the foreign trade and financeof OPEC and
the LDCs. The fundamental presumption here is thatforeign borrowing of the
LDCs is determined by the E4 of loans from theU.S.,OECD,and OPEC, rather
than the demand for loans. For reasons described inmany theoretical studies of
foreign lending, this form of credit rationing results from the riskof debt
repudiation by the LDCs. New foreign financing (i.e. measured by thecurrent
account deficit) is written as a function of three variables.First, we assume
that there is inertia in the quantity of netlending, so CA is a function of
CA1. Second, net new lending is a decreasing functionof the existing stock
of debt. Third, net new lending is an increasing functionof the value of LDC




— +C'D ) [1n(l—w)/c]}
U00 P U00 Where DEBT =+ (AL/A+AL + BL+(BL/A).
Here,the LDC current account balance is in constant U.S. dollarprices (i.e.
current dollar value deflated by pU) Net new foreignborrowing of the LDCs of
course equals —CAt. As DEBTt rises, CA is raised, indicating thata higher stock
of real debt restricts the availability of new loans.Similarly, a rise in
constant—dollar exports, ), reduces CA, indicating that creditors
are willing to extend new loans when LDC exports are high.
Note the multiplicand i +n(i—w)/€],and the constant term .Theseterms
L, 0 U P have the following significance. For agiven LDC export value, A
equation (16) guarantees that DEBTt converges totimes the export level.
Thus,signifies a target debt—export ratio on the part of the creditors. In—12—
turn, when DEBT = it is easy to verify from (16) that
CA =—nDEBT,sothat the current account deficit, nDEBTt, is exactly enough to
keep the foreign debt growing at the rate n. In this way, the debt/export ratio
remains constant. The parameters w and P were estimated over the period 1911 to
l98 using data for non—oil LDC current account, net debt and exports (source:
WEO).Theresults of the regression were:
CA =0.9CA + 0.3 DEBT. —O.1Exports =.91
(6.3)' (6.6)
Assuming n =.03this implies i3 =.9,£ =.3,=1.55.For the
simulations we assume that the initial steady state value foris 1.86, the
1983 value.
The value of LDC imports is simply given by the value of LDC exports, minus
the level of interest servicing on the debt, plus the current account 'oalance.
Thus:
L OL FL L 0 U P




+v'(B) + r°(AA°) + v0(BA0)1 —CAL
In turn, the value of total imports, C + A°C + AC is divided between
expenditure on U.S., OECD and OPEC goods on the basis of constant expenditures
shares T1 and(l—fl1—n2) (i.e. Cobb—Douglas utility) so that
(18) (a) C n1(C+A0C÷AC)
L L OL FL 0
(b) C0 =fl2(CC0+A c)/A
(c) C =—15--
Table 3: Four Region Model of the World
U.S. Equations
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Now we turn to the pricing of LDC output. is the nominal price
of LDC output in U.S. dollars. It is set as a variable markup over a basket of
U.S., OECD and OPEC goods, where the markup depends on the volume of LDC exports
to these regions. From (18), the LDC import price index should be written
(P )(PE) (P ) , sowe adopt the following pricing rule:
(19) =(PU)1(p0E)2(PP)12(cUOP)YL
For later use, it is convenient to denote the TDC terms of trade,
(i—n—n)
pL/[(pU) 1(P0E) 2(P) 1 2,asS, and to point out that each one percent
increase in LDC export volume raises the LDC terms of trade by1L percent. In
the simulations, we choose 1L =0.5.
Finally, we turn to the equations for the OPEC bloc. The equations for
OPEC imports and the pricing of OPEC output are derived in the same manner as
for the LDCs. In deriving the OPEC current account equation we assume that OPEC
adjusts its consumption expenditure to reach a target ratio of wealth to
income. The specific form of the equation is the following:
P UO L PU P P
(20) CAt =I(P(Cp+Cp+Cp)t(PIF Ht_11
+nHti
Here ijisthe desired ratio of wealth to income. A rise in OPEC income leads to
a short—run improvement in OPEC's current account, until assets are accumulated
to restore the desired wealth income ratio. It is easy to verify that when
c+c÷c)(PP/PU) =Hthe following holds:
P P CA =nH
so that the current account surplus (nH) is sufficient to keep wealth growing
at rate n. Since income is growing at rate n, the wealth income ratio remains-l -
constant.We estimated the equation for CA over the period 1971 to 19using
data for the current account and exports of oil exporting countries and data for
OPEC wealth (WEO, pp. 50, 58). The result was:
CA =•5)EXPORTS —.26H () (-6.1)
assuming n =.03this implies=.29and 4' =1.86.
B.Numerical Parameterization and Simulation Methodology
The entire model is set forth in Table 3, and a list of variable
definitions is given at the end of the table. Formally, the model is a
twenty—dimensional non—linear difference equation system, with the following
• • U00 U 0ppU0 OU U list of state variables: P, Pt,AUt,ALt,ALt,ALt,AOt,BLt,BLt,Bt,Bt,v1,
O P U 0 Cu CO L
v1,H1,Q1, P1, P1, CAt1, and Et. Let Z signify this vector
of state variables. Then, the model can be written implicitly in the form:
(21) =F(Zt,C)
where C is a vector of "control" (or policy) variables selected by the
macroeconomic authorities of the U.S. and OECD. The vector C includes G, T,
M, G, T and M. In the calculations of policy multipliers, the path of C
is set exogenously. In the policy optimization exercises, C is selected
(either cooperatively or non—cooperatively by the U.S. and OECD), to maximize
a dynamic policy function subject to (21).
Of the 20variables in Z,the first 19 are known as "pre—determined"
variables,sinceat any time t, the world economy inherits from the past the








= (A+CA)/(1+n)—[(A0÷B°) (A0+B0) /(1+n)+A —A/(1+n)] L Lt+1 I Lt Ot+1 Ot
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A Claims on country jheldby private creditors in country i
B Claims on country jheldby official creditors in country i
B' Government debt of country i





E Exchange rate ($/ECu)
G Government Expenditure
H Real Financial Wealth
I Nominal interest rate
M Nominal money supply
n Growth rate





r Real interest rate—20—
T Taxes
TB Trade Balance
v Concessional real interest rate
A Real exchange rate—21—
Q1 ,P1,CA1. The twentieth variable in Zt, the exchange rateEt,
not inheritedfrom the past. Rather, as is common in perfect foresight dynamic
models, Et is selected as the unique value of'the exchange rate that keeps the
overallecononr dynamically stable, given the inherited values of the rest of
Z, and the anticipated path of current and future
For manypurposes, it issimpler to work with a linearized version of the
model of T&ble 3 (this is particularly true when we study the optimal policy
packages of the U.S. and the OECD). Thus, in practice, the model of Table 3 is
linearized in the following way. All price variables, e.g., P, are
re—interpreted as the exponents of log prices. Thus, we write log prices by
u u L L
using lower—case variables, e.g. Pt =iog(F)and =log(A),and so rewrite
the equation A = asexp(*)exp(p)/exp(p). All quantity
variables are kept in level form. Then, the model is linearized about a set
of initial conditions, which have the property that all prices start at 1.0 (and
all log prices at 0.0). Thus, upon linearization, the AL equation is simply
L L U . X=Pt
— forexample. A detailed version of the linearized model is
availablefrom the authors upon request.
Letus now turn to the numerical parameterization of the model. In
calibrating the model, we require coefficients for structural equations, trade
and expenditure shares and initial asset stocks. The initial asset stocks are
required for the linearization. A list of key assumed parameter values for the
coefficients of the structural equations is shown in Table 4 As a starting
point for empirical investigation, and in lieu of econometric estimates, the
U.S. and OECD are treated as having the same structure in aggregate demand,—22—
pricing, and money demand. The only differences between the regions are in the
composition and direction of trade (which are directly measurable in the data),
and in portfolio preferences (where the differences are to some degree
measurable in the data, as well as being based on the general observation that
international debts are predominantly denominated in U.S. dollars).
The direction and composition of trade is based on 1983 trade data of the IMF
Direction of Trade Statistics (DOT), values for which are shown in Table 5. The
numbersin parentheses express the $valuesas a share of 1983 U.S. GDP.
The figures for trade between OPEC and the LDCs were derived by the authors from




Exportsfrom U.S. OECD LDC OPEC
U.S. 125.5 58.9 i6.1
(.038) (.018) (.005)
OECD 153.3 —— 151.0 76.8
(.o''r) (.oI6) (.023)
LDC 77.9 12I.8 —— 81t.1
(.02)4) (.038) (.026)
OPEC 2)4.7 110.0 96.9 ——
(.008) (.03)4) (.030)
*The numbers in parentheses are shares of U.S. GDP.
oil—exporting developing countries. To approximate exports from OPEC to the
LDCs we used the following procedure. We calculated total OPEC exports less
industrial country imports from OPEC. We then calculated total LDC imports less—23--
industrialcountry exports to the LDCs. The first measure yields an
underestimate and the second yields an overestimate of OPEC exports to the LDCs.
Both measures were then averaged to get the figure in the table. A similar
procedure was used to calculate exports from the LDCs to OPEC. The data
from this trade matrix are used to derive the following parameters: to 16,
to and to fl14.
Tn1npiriin t.h mn1-n frrminry i-mrc pi 1
'2
require initial asset stocks. We use estimates of these stocks as of the end of
1983. We now describe the procedures followed to derive these estimates. The
data sources include: IMF World Economic Outlook (WE0), World Debt
Tables(WDT), World Bank (WB), Economic Report of the President (ERP) and
Mattione (1983).
• LDC debt
We assume that total LDC gross debt is 16% short term debt (less than
1 year to maturity) and 8% long term debt (see WEO, Table 31). Of the long term
debt 39% is held by official creditors and 61% by private creditors. Assuming
that short term debt is all private creditors, this implies that total LDC debt
is 33% official creditor and 61% private creditor.
Using currency composition of long debt (source WB) we find that 78% of
long debt is in $US and 22% is in ECU (where all the residual, 6%, is allocated
to $us). Note that "ECU" debt here signifies an OECD currency of denomination
other than the U.S. dollar. Assuming that short debt is all $US denominated,
thisimplies total debt is 82% US and 18% ECU. By further calculation from data—24—
on the currency compositon of LDC debt we estimate the currency composition of
the debt, disaggregated into the type of creditor, given in Table 6. Note that
the cateogry "$US official debt" includes loans from international agencies.
Debt is also distinguished by the nature of the interest charges, in particular
whether the rate is fixed or floating (i.e. pegged to a short—term rate such as
LIBOR), and whether the rate is at market terms or concessional terms. For our
purposes, we will treat all market—determined rates in a particular currency to
be at the same level (i.e. we will not distinguish the rates on fixed versus
floating securities). We do, of course, make a separate allowance for market
versus concessional rates. LDC Gross Debt is given in Table 7. Net debt is
calculated by subtracting LDC reserves from the gross debt.
Table 6: LDC Gross Debt by Type of Loan
(end of 1983)
Share of
Type of Creditor Interest Rate Total Debt
ECU private floating, market 3%
ECU private fixed, market 7%
ECU official fixed, concessional 1%
OPEC private floating, market 12%
U.S. private floating, market 31%
U.S. private fixed, market 8%
U.S. official fixed, concessional29%
Private floating, market 146%
Private fixed, market 15%
Official fixed, concessional39%
Source: Authors' estimates based on data cited in the text.—25—
Table7: LDC Debt Positions
(end of 1983) $U.S..h
Debt Outstanding of Non—oil LDCs (WEO, p.B) 685.5
+IMFcredit (NRa p67) 10.3
LDC GrossDebtOutstanding 695
Reserves of All (Non—oil) LDC's (WEO, p,66) 100.2
LDC Net Debt 595.6
By applying the share of each type of creditor in total debt to the gross
debt figure in Table 6, we are able to derive the breakdown of debt given in
Table 8. Since we are only allowing for a market interest rate and a
concessional interest rate, the private creditor debt is aggregated and assumed
to be earning a market rate whereas the official creditor debt is assuned to be
earning the concessional interest rate. The breakdown of net debt into type of
lender is shown in Table 9. It is derived assuming that 70% of LDC reserves
are in $US and 30% in ECU (see Kenen (1983), p. 17', where we assume that all
unspecified sources are $us). We subtract the value of 10% of LDC reserves from
U.S. market rate loans, assuming that LDC reserves earn market rates.
Accordingly we subtract the value of 30% of LDC reserves from ECU market rate
loans. The stocks are then converted into shares of US GDP (l98) where US GDP
in 198)4 is used to be consistent with the timing in the model.(end of 1983)
—26—




OPEC Loans to LDC5*
>USShare of $Loans
U.S.Loans at Market Rates
U.S. $Loansat
Concessional Rates
ECU Loans at Market Rates
ECU Loans at
Concessional Rates
OPEC Loans at Market Rates
*Source: WEO,p.58.
(end of 1983)
Table 9: Composition of LDC Net Debt































NetDebt LDC 596 .163 ——
U.S.$ Loansat Market Rates 201 .055 A
U.S.$ Loansat Concessional Rates 201 .055 B
ECULoans atMarket Rates 4O .011 i4
ECULoans atConcessional Rates 70 .019 B
OPEC$ Loansat Market Rates 8I .023—27—
0 OPECHoldings of US, OECD and LDC assets
We base our calculations of OPEC asset holdings on data contained in
Mattione (1983; Table I.)4).Thedata is only available for the beginning of
1983. Therefore we derive the proportions to 1983 GDP and assume the same
ratios for end of 1983. Our assumptions are presented in Table 10. We assume
Table 10: OPEC Asset Holdings
(beginning of 1983) _____________________________________
ShareofShare of Variable
$USb Total USGDP Name
$placements (.TxTotal) 2614.1 0.7 ——
inUS 86.7 ——
inLDC's* 114.0 0.2 .023
in OECD 103.14 ——
ECUplacements (.3 x total) 113.2 0.3 .03144
$ Claimsagainst U.S. citizens 190.1 0.5 .0584
TotalNet Assets 317.3 1.0 .115
*Note that the 1982 value for OPEC loans to LDCs given in Mattione
(214.9b) is less than the value given in the WEO (714b). The value used
here is from WEO. The $US placements in the OECD has been adjusted
accordingly.
that 70% of OPEC assets are held in dollars (Mattione, p. 21). Assume that
OPEC holds $86,Ib in claims against U.S. residents in the U.S. (Mattione, Table
114) and $714b in claims against the LDCs (WEO, p. 58). This implies that the
remainder of claims held by OPEC in dollars are held in the OECD ($lO3.ltb). We
assume that these claims are held in Eurodollar deposits in Europe and are
effectively claims against U.S. citizens. These OPEC claims against U.S.
citizens held in Europe are then added to the OPEC claims against U.S. citizens—28—
heldin the U.S. to get the total OPEC claims against the U.S., given in
Table 10. This gives $190.lb or 50% of total OPEC asset holdings as claims
against the US. The remaining 50% is divided between holdings of dollar
denominated LDC assets (20%) and ECU—denominated OECD assets (30%).
• U.S. Assets
We still need to derive the initial stock of US assets held by OECD
residents and the outstanding stock of US and OECD government bonds. From the
Economic Report of the President (198)4) we have the net asset position of the
U.S.(adjusting for direct foreign investment)beginningin 1983. We can add to
thisthe net U.S. holdings of claims against the LDCs and subtract the net OPEC
holdings of claims against the U.S. (held in the U.S.) to arrive at a figure for
net OECD claims against the U.S. We assume a figure of $280b (.088 as a share
of 1983 U.S. GDP). We use the total US government debt held by private agents
net of Federal Reserve holdings as the stock of Government debt. From ERP
(198)4) this is equal to $986b at the end of 1983 (.2y of 198)4 U.S. GD?).
• OECD Asset Holdings
We have already derived the OECD holdings of US and LDC assets and the
claims against the OECD held by OPEC. We assume that the outstanding stock of
OECD government debtis the same proportion of OECD GD? as the US stock isof US
GDP. This give a figure for the stock of outstanding OECD govenment debt as a












LDCs .055 .055 .011 .019 .023
Table 11 summarizes the asset positions that we have derivedas proportions of
US GDP.
II. Numerical Simulations
Using the parameterization just described, we now study five types of
?disturbancestt in the model: (1) a sustained U.S. fiscalpolicy expansion (1%
of US GDP); (2) a sustained U.S. monetary policy expansion (1% of MU);(3) a
sustained OECD fiscal policy expansion (1% of OECD GOP); (14)a sustained OECD
monetary expansion (i of M°); and (5) a portfolio shiftaway from
dollar—denominated assets, toward ECU—denominated assets.
The model was simulated using two alternative techniques forsolving
dynamic rational expectations models. These were multiple shooting (seeLipton
et al., 1982), and the Fair—Taylor method (see Fair and Taylor, 1983). Wefound
that if either technique ran into convergence problems the othertechnique
—29—







Table 12 shows various aspects of a sustained, bond—financed U.S. fiscal
expansion, beginning in 19814. The fiscal expansion begins as a 1% of GDP rise
in government expenditure, with no change in taxes. Over time, the higher
expenditure level is left unchanged, but taxes are raised in line with rising
debt—service changes, in order to keep the deficit constant at 1% of GDP. To
read the table, note that tP%?fsignifiespercentage deviation from the initial
baseline;"D" signifies the level deviation from the initial baseline; "$bl"
signifies billions of dollars deviation from •the initial baseline; and t$814?
signifies the devaluation from baseline in constant, 19814 dollars.
In the case of a U.S. fiscal expansion, we have a rise in U.S. GDP of
0.9 percent relative to the baseline in the first year, and lower inflation of
0.2 percentage points. The inflation reduction has two sources: on the one
hand, the exchange rate appreciates 3.14 percent, which contributes to reduced
import prices; on the other hand, the inflationary effects of the fiscal
expansion via the Phillips curve do not operate (by assumption) until 1985. In
the second year of the shock, inflation is 0.2 percentage points higher than the
baseline. U.S. short—term interest rates rise by 0.8 percentage points
(80 basis points) above the baseline in 19814, and are 1.3 percentage points
above baseline in the third year of the shock. The U.S. current account worsens
by-$16b,or 0.14 percent of GDP, in 19814, and continues to worsen for the next
three years.
As explained in Sachs and Wyplosz (19814), the short—run appreciation of the
dollar is reversed in the long run, as the OECD claims on the U.S. rise over—31—
Table 12: Effects of U.S. Fiscal Expansion
1981198519861987
US GDP ($81) 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.lt
US GDP ($81) $b 32.337.330.515.1
US INFLATION D —0.2 0.2 0.It 0.5
USINTEREST RATE D 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.5
EXCHANGERATE ($/E) _3.)43.5—3.5—3.5
OECDGDP 0.9 0.3—0.3 —0.7'
OECDINFLATION 0.2 0.6 0.50.3
OECD INTEREST RATE D 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.1
LDC IMPORTS ($) —1.0—1.0—1.3—1.6
LDC IMPORTS ($) $b —3.3—3.6 —b. —6.i
LDC IMPORTS (vol) i.1 0.90.2 —0.
LDC EXPORTS ($) —0.7—0.6—0.6—0.6
LDC EXPORTS (5) Sb —2.3—2.1—2.1—2.0
LDC EXPORTS (voi) 1.1 0.8 0.6 O.1
LDC CA (5) % OF US GDP 0.0 0.0—0.1—0.1
LDC CA ($) $b 0.0—0.7—2.0—2.3
LDC IN ON DEBT ($) % OF US GDP 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
LDC IN ON DEBT (5) 2.1 2.53.4 I.6
US CA Cs) % OF US GDP Q14 —0.5—0.5—0.6
US CA (5) $b —i6.o —17.5 —20.7 —23.9
LDC CAP GAIN ON DEBT C$) % OF US GDP 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
LDC CAP GAIN ON DEBT (5) $b 0.0 0.8 2.4 3.3
PRICE OF LDC EXPORTS IN $Us —1.8—1.5—1.2—1.0
LDC TOT 0.5 0.14 0.3 0.2
OPEC TOT 0.14 0.2 0.0—0.2—32—
time. Figure 1 shows the 55—year trajectory of the real and nominal exchange
rate. After an initial jump appreciation of 3.14 percent, the nominal exchange
rate peaks at 3.5 percent appreciation relative to baseline, and then gradually
depreciates over the remaining time. Just as the appreciation in the early
years helps to export inflation, the subsequent depreciation may be thought of
as a re—import of the inflation. However, even though the inflationary gains
from onrrency appreolation are temporary, it maystillhedeirahleto induce a
real appreciation at the beginning of a disinflation program, since on a path of
declining inflation, the appreciation exports inflation when inflation is high
(and therefore socially costly), while the subsequent depreciation re—imports
inflation when it is low. We return to this argument later.
The table also outlines various effects of the U.S. expansion on the rest
of the world. OECD GDP rises by 0.9 percent in the first year, though it falls
relative to baseline in 1986—81. Inflation rises on impact, as the ECU
depreciation raises OECD import prices. ECU nominal interest rates are pulled
up in line with U.S. rates. The expansion has three effects on LDC foreign
trade. First, the rise in interest rates raises the interest servicing bill, by
$2.lb in 19814. Second, the dollar price of LDC exports and imports both
fall. falls by 1.8 percent in 19814, due to the 3.14 percent dollar
appreciation. The import price index falls by 2.3 percent, so that the LDC
terms of trade improve slightly, by .5 percent. Third, export volumes rise, as
the real economic activity in the U.S. and OECD both increase. In fact, the
percentage rise in export volumes is less than the fall in trade prices, so that






























































































































































volumes allows a i.1 percent increase in import volumes in 198)4. As we shall
see, the welfare implications of these three effects are, on balance, negative,
since the small terms—of—trade gain does not outweigh the losses from higher
interest rates.
The implications of a U.S. monetary expansion are shown next, in Table 13.
A U.S. monetary expansion causes a more inflationary boom in the U.S., as the
exchange rate now depreciates on impact. Per unit of GDP gain, monetary policy
is more inflationary than fiscal policy. Also, per unit of GDP gain, the
worsening of the U.S. current account is less with monetary policy than with
fiscal policy. These differential effects of U.S. monetary and fiscal policy
have the following implications in the model. A policy mix of expansionary
fiscal policy (G increases by 1.1 percent of GDP), and contractionary monetary
policy (M declines by 0.9 percent), causes:
• no output change
• an inflation reduction of —0.2percentagepoints in the first year
• a worsening of the current account of $15.8b in the first year
Aslong as the current account is not a short—run target, the "Mundellian mix"
of loose G, tight M is an attractive anti—inflationary mix.
Notethe effects of a U.S. monetary expansion on the rest of the world.
Contrary to the case of U.S. fiscal policy, the monetary experience brings net
benefits to the LDCs. Interest rates (particularly real interest rates) are
reduced by the money expansion. The interest burden falls $l.9b in 198)4, and
though it rises slightly in nominal terms in 1985 and 1986 ($0.3b and $0.6b),
it falls as well in later years when measured in real terms. Specifically, the—35--
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real interest payments fall by $l.9b in l981, $1.5b in 1985,and$0.8b in 1986.
The U.S. monetary expansion slightly worsens the LDC terms of trade by
0.1 percent in l981 but improves it thereafter, and it increases the prices of
exports and imports relative to U.S. prices. We show later that an
equiproportional rise in the real price of exports and imports (relative to pUS)
is welfare worsening as long as the LDCs are running trade balance deficits along
the pre—shock path.
The major differences in effects of OECD policy and U.S. policy lie in the
differing effects on the exchange rate. As seen in Tables li and 15, an OECD
fiscal expansion strengthens the ECU, while a monetary expansion weakens the
ECU. Following an OECD fiscal expansion, the dollar price of LDC exports rises,
while it falls with a U.S. expansion.
A final experiment, shown in Table 16, is the case of a portfolio shift in
the private sector, away from $assetsand towards ECU assets. We include this
case for two reasons. First, there is a school of thought which attributes at
least part of the post—'19 rise of the dollar to a "safe haven" effect on the
U.S., pulling in funds from abroad. This safe haven effect maybemodelled as a
portfolio shift, and can therefore be read off of Table 16, with the signs
reversed. Second, there is also some debate as to the dangers from a reversal
of that effect in coming years, often stated as the question: "What happens in
the near future when European and Japanese asset holders recognize the
implications of the looming U.S. current account deficits and start to 'move
out' of dollars?" The shock is modelled as an intercept shift (dl <a)in the
portfolio equation (11):—37—
Table 1)4:Effects of OECD Monetary Expansion
19814 19851986 1987
US GOP ($814) 0.00.10.10.0
US GDP ($814) $b 1.1 5.214.2 —1.1
USINFLATION ID 0.00.00.10.1
US INTEREST RATE D 0.00.10.20.2
EXCHMTGE RATE ($/E) —0.5 —0.6 —0.8 —1.0
OECD GDP 1.30.6 —0.1 —0.7
OECD INFLATION 0.00.70.7 0.14
OECD INTEREST RATE D 0.10.30.5 0.14
LDC IMPORTS ($) 1.01.00.80.5
LDC IMPORTS Cs) $b 3.3 3.14 2.91.8
LDC IMPORTS (vol) 1.1 0.7'0.2 —0.2
LDC EXPORTS($) 0.60.60.5 0.14
LDC EXPORTS Cs) $b 1.92.01.9 1.3
LDC EXPORTS (vol) % 0.50.20.0 —0.2
LDC CA CS) % OF US GOP 0.00.00.00.0
LDC CA ($) Sb —0.2 —0.3 —0.8 —0.9
LDC IN ON DEBT ($) % OF US GDP 0.00.00.00.0
LDC IN ON DEBT CS) $b —0.2 —0,10.3 0.7'
US CA CS) % OF US GOP 0.00.00.00.0
US CA ($) Sb 0.01.10.8 —0.1
LDC CAP GAIN ON DEBT C$) % OF US GOP 0.00.00.00.0
LDC CAP GAIN ON DEBT ($) Sb 0.00.00.50.8
PRICE OF LDC EXPORTS IN SUS 0.1 0.14 0.60.6
LDC TOT 0.30.10.0 —0.1
OPEC TOT 0.140.20.0 —0.2—38—
Table15: Effects of OECD Fiscal Expansion
19814 198519861987
US GDP ($814) 0.80.3 —0.1—0.5
US GDP ($814) $b 28.3 13.1 —3.7 —20.5
US INFLATION D 0.20.50.5 0.14
US INITEHEST HATE D 0.70.91.1 1.1
EXCHANGE RATE ($/E) 3.12.72.2 1.7
OECD GDP 1.31.00.5—0.3
DECO INFLATION —0.10.60.8 0.8
OECD INTEREST HATE D 1.1i.62.0 2.3
LDC IMPORTS ($) 3.03.13.1 2.9
LDC IMPORTS ($) $b 10.1 10.9 11.)410.7
LDC IMPORTS (vol) 0.5 0.140.1 —0.14
LDC EXPORTS ($) 2.93.23.5 3.6
LDC EXPORTS ($) $b 9.2 10.14 11.9 12.5
LDC EXPORTS (vol) 0.30.30.3 0.2
LDC CA ($) % OFUS GOP 0.0 —0.1 —0.1—0.1
LDC CA ($) $b —0.7 —14.6—14.811.3
LDC IN ON DEBT ($) % OFUS GOP 0.00.00.1 0.1
LDC IN ON DEBT Cs) $b 0.71.93.3 14.9
US CA ($) % OFUS GDP 0.30.20.2 0.2
US CA ($) $b 10.31.57.6 7.8
LDC CAP GAIN ON DEBT (5) % OFUS GDP 0.00.10.1 0.1
LDC CAP GAIN ON DEBT ($) Sb 0.03.33.1 2.5
PRICE OF LDC EXPORTS IN $US 2.62.93.2 3•14
LDC TOT 0.10.20.2 0.1
OPEC TOT O.]4 0.30.1—0.1—39—














US INFLATION 0 0.9 i.6 1.2 0.7
US INTEREST RATE D 2.2 2.6 2.9 3.0
EXCHANGE RATE ($/E) % 12.912.512.612.9
OECD GOP % —2.5—0.2 1.5 2.2
OECD INFLATION % —0.6—1.7—1.0—0.1
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LDC CAP GAIN ON DEBT($) % OFUSGNP 0.0 0,3 0,2 0.1
LDC CAP GAIN ON DEBT($) $b 0.011.5 8.14 5.0
PRICE OF LDC EXPORTSINSUS 8.14 8.0 8.5 9.2
LDC TOT —0.8—0.1 0.14 0.7'
OPEC TOT —0.7—0.1 0.3—40—
(22) (AAg)/A =dl+ +
Themagnitude of dl is selected so that the dollar depreciates by about 13
percent on impact. As expected, such a shift raises U.S. interest rates and
0 P 0
reduces European interest rates, since the existing stocks of Au, AL and B
must be willingly held by OECD residents, even after dollar assets lose some of
their attractiveness. U.S. inflation rises, while OECD inflation falls, in view
of the dollar depreciation. Given the presumed elasticities of trade flows,
U.S. GDP rises, as the expansionary effect of the real exchange rate
depreciation outweighs the contractionary effect of rising interest rates, while
OECD GDP falls. As usual, we identify three effects on LDC welfare. First, the
dollar depreciation raises the price of LDC exports and imports in terms of U.S.
goods. Second, there is an ambiguous effect on the LDC terms of trade, since
U.S. GDP rises, while OECD GDP falls. In fact, the LDC TOT worsens by
0.8 percent. Finally, U.S. real interest rates rise, raising the debt servicing
burden on the developing countries. Note that (real) interest payments increase
by a total of $ll.Ob in the first three years following the portfolio shift.
III. The Implications of PolicyCoordination
In several recent papers (including Oudiz and Sachs, 19814a, and Oudiz and
Sachs, l984b), we have investigated the implications of policy coordination for
macroeconomic equilibrium in a multi—country poitcy setting. One theme has
emerged repeatedly. In a regime of floating exchange rates, and in an
environment with high initial inflation, policymakers in each country have an—41—
incentive to choose a policy mix to strengthen their currency, thereby exporting
inflation abroad. This strategic attempt may beggar the country's trading
partners (by forcing them to import inflation), but even more importantly, it
may leave all countries worse off than under alternative policies. The policy
inefficiency arises because the mutual attempts to export inflation cancel out
(at least partially), while the mechanisms by which thecurrency appreciation is
attempted impose a direct cost In particular, countries may be led to pursue
overly restrictive monetary policies and overly expansionary fiscal policies,
for exchange rate purposes. High interest rates will be a side effect of this
non—cooperative process. We have shown that a equilibrium allows
a more balanced (and presumably more desirable) policy mix.
Earlier work has called into question the quantitative importance of policy
coordination (the qualitative importance may be established on theoretical
grounds alone). In Oudiz and Sachs (l9Ba), we found in a threecountry game
that the gains to the U.S., Germany, and Japan are rather modest. This paper
points out an aspect of the issue not previously remarked upon. Even if the
gains within the developed country region are rather small, the LDCs may have a
great deal at stake in successful coordination among the advanced countries.
After all, the LDCs are large losers in any process which promotes high real
interest rates, as does the adoption. of a mix with expansionary fiscal and
contractionary monetary policies. Since the move to coordination reduces real
interest rates, the LDCs prove to be large beneficiaries in the process.
The analytical framework for studying policy coordination is complex, and
a self—contained discussion would necessarily be lengthy. Here, we merely—42--
present some simulation results based on the techniques developed in our earlier
papers. In particular, we postulate intertemporal policy objective functions,
for the U.S. and the rest of the OECD, of the form:
(23) =oot(UCUUU)
(21k) V0 = tv(QOxCOcAODEFO)
Thus, welfare in each country depends on the time path of the output gap,
inflation, current account deficit, and budget deficit. A quadratic form for
V is selected. Specifically, we assume=(1/1.1)and the quadratic form





non—cooperative setting, U.S. policymakers select U.S. policies (4U,GU,TU) to
maximize VU, subject to the policies selected by the UECD; while OECI)
authorities similarly select policies to maximize V0, subject to the choices in
the U.S. In the cooperative setting, a single policy controller chooses
U U U 0 0 .. u 0
M ,G ,T ,M ,G ,i)inorder to maximize a weighted average of V and V ,such
as aVU +(1—a)V°.Let VUN and V be the U.S. utility levels reached in the
non—cooperative and cooperative cases (similar definitions hold for VON and
Then, for appropriate choices of a, we show that coordination is welfare
- . UC UN OC ON improving for both countries, i.e. V >Vand V >V •Thespecific
numerical techniques for finding the equilibria are quite involved, requiring a
repeated application of dynamic programming. Details may be found in Oudiz and
Sachs (l98lb).
We show in this section that non—cooperative policymakers with the—43--
objective functions in (23) and (24), choose a high interest rate strater for
disinflation with the goal of maintaining a strong currency. Under cooperation
the same goals are reached with sharply reduced interest rates, to the benefit
of the LDCs. The gain to the LDCs is, strictly speaking, a loss to the
developed countries rather than a pure efficiency gain from cooperation. With
lower interest rates, the LDCs pay less to their creditors in the U.S., OECD and
OPEC, so that the real transfer burden is reduced.
Why would the policy authorities in the TJS. and OECD coordinate in such a
way as to reduce the flow of real income from the LDCs? One reason is that
real GDP, and not real income, enters their objectives in (23) and (21). The
policy authorities are assumed not to care directly about the size of the real
interest payments from the LDCs (they care insofar as those payments indirectly
affect output, inflation, the current account, etc.). The effects of
coordination on real interest rates are therefore incidental to the effects on
output, inflation, and the other targets in the developed countries. We
believe that this is an accurate reflection of the policy goals in the U.S. and
the rest of the OECD, We have also tried including interest flows in the
objective functions by using GNP rather than GDP as a target. The effect was to
alter the quantitive results, with a modest reduction in the gains for the LDCs
from coordination, although the qualitative results remained unchanged. The
gains to the LDCs remain significant, it appears, because the effects of
monetary and fiscal policies on output and inflation in the developed countries
are far more important, in quantitive terms, than the effects of these policies
on interest flows from the LDCs. For example a monetary contraction of 1%—44—
reduces U.S. output by $140 billion while increasing interest payments from the
LDCs by less than $2 billion. Thus monetary and fiscal policy seem to be geared
primarily to output and inflation, as we assume, rather than to the size of
interest transfers from the LDCs.
Thus we stress again that the gains to the LDCs from US—OECD coordination
are, by and large not efficiency gains, but transfer gains, that result from
policy shifts related to inflation and output in the developed countries. The
high real interest rates of the last four years have been the side effects of a
particular disinflation strategy, rather than an attempt to extract extra
interest payments from the LDCs. Similarly, a reduction in real interest rates
from greater coordination of policies would have a salutary, if unintended,
effect on LDC welfare.
In Tables 11 and 18 we compare the non—cooperative and cooperative
equilibria. As an illustration, we assume that both the U.S. and the OECD
inherit a10t inflation rate, and then pursue policies of disinflation.
In the non—cooperative setting, both regions embark on a mix of sharp fiscal
expansion and monetary contraction in the attempt of both to keep their
currencies strong. The policy ndx for the U.S. is shown in Figure 2. The
monetary policy calls for a decrease of 12 percent in MU in the first year of
the disinflation, followed by a return to fast money growth two years later.
Basically, this policy involves a large one—shot reduction in the path of MU/PU.
Fiscal policy, on the other hand, is extremely expansionary, with the deficit
rising briefly to 5 percent of GDP. A similar set of actions is undertaken
abroad, though given the specific parameter assumptions of the model the overall—45—
Table 17: Effects of Non—Cooperative Disinflation
i9R 198519861987
US GOP ($81i) % —9.6 —7.7' —6.2 —5.0
US GDP ($81) Sb —350.8 —288.9 —240.1 —200.1
US INFLATION 0 9.5 5.7 )4,6 3.7
US INTEREST RATE D 16.1 11.7' 9.5 7.7
EXCHANGE RATE ($/E) —5.514.6 —3.2 —1.7
OECD GOP —9.8 —1.0 —5.2 —3.8
OECDINFLATION 10.0 14.7 3.5 2.5
OECDINTEREST RATE D 15.1 10.7' 8.14 6.6
LDCIMPORTS Cs) —6.7 1.1 6.1 10.3
LOC IMPORTS (5) $b —23.0 3.7' 22.0 38.3
LDC IEXPORTS (Voi) —11.1 —9.2 —9.1 —9.0
LDC EXPORTS Cs) 3.9 9.1 1)4.0i.6
LDC EXPORTS ($) Sb 12.6 31.8b.6 61.5
LDC EXPORTS (vol) —0.2 —0.14 —0.7 —1,1
IJDCCACs) % OF US GDP —1.6 —0.8 —0.6 —0.14
LDC CA ($) $b —57.9—31.8 —214.1—17.8
LDC IN ON DEBT ($) % OF US GOP 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.6
LDC IN ON DEBT (5) $b 37.14 29.8 27.1 214.5
US CA (5) % OF USGOP —2.5 —1.7 —1.51.11
CACs) $b —91.5—65.3—59.1 —5)4. 0
LDC CAP GAIN ON DEBT ($) % OF (iS GOP 1.6 0.9 0.1 0.6
LDC CAP GAIN ON DEBT Cs) Sb 59.5 3)4.9 28.6 23.5
PRICE OF LOC EXPORTS IN SUS 14.2 10.0 1)4.8 18.1
LDCTOT —0.1 —0.2 —0.14 —0.5
OPECTOT _14.3 —3.3 —2.8 —2.14—46—
Table 18: Effects of Cooperative Disinflation
198)4 1985 1986 1987'
US GDP ($8)4) —9.7 —7'.8 —6.2 —5.0
USGOP ($8)4) $b —353.7' —291.5 —2)41.6 —200.9
US INFLATION 0 9.6 5.7 )4.6 3.7
US INTEREST RATE 0 io.)4 8.6 6.9
EXCHANGE RATE ($/E) )43 —3.3 —1.9 —0.3
OECD GDP —9.9 —7.1 —5.2 —3.8
OECD INFLATION 10.0 )4.s 3.)4 2.)4
OECD INTEREST RATE D 9.3 6.8 )4.7 3.1
LDC IMPORTS ($) —3.6 3.5 8.6 12.8
LDC IMPORTS ($) $b —12.5 12.2 31.0 )47'.8
LDCIMPORTS (voi) —8.8—.6 —1.5 —7.3
LDC EXPORTS ($) 1.1 8.)4 13.3 17.2
LDC EXPORTS ($) $b 3.6 27.7 )45.o60.1
LDC EXPORTS (vol) —2.7 —1.8 —1.8 —1.9
LDC CA ($) % OFUS GDP —1.6 —0.8 —0.6 —o.)4
LDCCA () $b —56.9—30.6—22.8—16.6
LDC IN ON DEBT ($) % OFUS GOP 0.5 o.)4 o.)4 0.3
LDC IN ON DEBT ($) $b 16.9 15.9 1)4.0 12.3
US CA ($) % OFUS GDP —1.9 —1.3 —1.2 —1.0
US CA ($) $b —69.)4—50.7 —)45.7 _)41.5
LDC CAP GAIN ON DEBT ($) % OFUS GDP 1.6 0.9 0.1 0.6
LDC CAP GAIN ON DEBT ($) $b 59.5 35.0 28.8 23.6
PRICE OF LDC (PORTS IN $US 3.8 10.2 15.1 19.1
LDC TOT —1.3 —0.9 —0.9 —0.9













Figure 3: U.S. Macroeconomic Policy Under Cooperative Disinflation
I Ti11!iriT
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mix yields a $appreciationof 5.5 percent. The U.S. nominal interest rate
rises to 21.1 percent in the first year of the disinflation. (Note that the
table shows an interest rate increase of 16.1, which is the difference of 21.1
percent and the baseline 5 percent rate.)
Under a cooperative policy regime, in which the weighting of the U.S. in
overall utility is 0.5 (with the OECD at 0.5), both the U.S. and OECD reach
higher levels of interterriporal utility with far less extreme policy mixes. In
Figure 3, we show the optimal paths of IJ.S. monetary and fiscal policy in the
cooperative regime. Now, the initial U.S. money contraction is 7 percent in the
first year, with no initial fiscal expansion. Nominal interest rates in the
U.S. rise to 15.14percent,a high level, but far below the 21.1 percent level
reached in the non—cooperative case. The dollar also appreciates by less, now
14.3 percent rather than 5.5 percent.
The effects of a move from non—cooperation to cooperation are significant
for the LDCs. Comparing Tables 17 and 18, we find the LTDC import volumes drop by
11.1 percent in the wake of non—cooperative disinflation, and by only 8.8
percent in the course of cooperative disinflation. LDC nominal interest
payments on the external debt are almost $2lb higher in 19814 in the case of
non—cooperative disinflation. In the next section we offer a more careful
accounting of the welfare effects of the shift to cooperation.
IV. Macroeconomic Policies in the U.S. and OECD,
and LDC Economic Welfare
Standard trade theory prescribes a simple measure of the welfare effects of
external shocks. Consider an initial path of LDC exports, imports, and foreign—49—
borrowing.When interest rates and trade prices change, we can ask how large an
income transfer the LDCs would require to allow them to purchase the initial
import basket, with unchanged levels of real exports and real foreign
indebtedness. This income transfer measures the "compensating variation" that
keeps the LDCs as well off as before the external changes.
In particular, we have the following equations:
(25)(a)DEBTt+i =(DEBT_CA)/(l+n)
(b)DEBTt = + ÷ + B + Bt
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L Now,suppose that the time path of DEBTt is unchanging, so that the path of CAt
is fixed. Consider the increased costs of purchasing the quantities C, C and
for
given real exports CLt + CLt + CLt, when rt, r. v, v, At, At and At
change. By differentiating (25)(c),wefind dT =dr(A+4)t+ dr(4)t
+ dvI(BU) + dv°(B°) —
dA1(C÷C0 ÷C )+dAC ÷ dAC where dT is
the real transfer (in units of U.S. output) required to permit the LOC to
purchase its original consumption basket. By re—arrangement we have:
UUp 00 UU 00
(26) dT =dr(AL+AL)+ dr(AL) + dvt(BL)t + dvt(BL)t
—(dA/A)
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+ (dA/A) (AtCot)/(Cut+AtCot+AtCpt)l (CUt+AtCOt+A±CPt)
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+ (dA/A) [(AtCpt)/(Cut+AtCot+AtCptfl (Cut+AtCot+AtCpt)—50—
Note that is the share of LDC imports from the OECD,
or s. A similar expression can be found for the share of LDC imports from OPEC
s. t(dA/A)s +(dA/A)s]is the percentage change in the (real) import
price index of the LDCs, that is in the price of imports deflated by U.S.
prices. Let A be this real import price, with dA/A =I(dA/A)s
+(dA/A)s].
Then, by one more rearrangement, we find:











From (21), we find that the required transfer (or compensating variation)
has three components. First, when real interest rates rise, the transfers must
increase by the change in real interest rates times the appropriate components
of real debt. Second, when real export prices in terms of U.S. goods, AL
increase, the transfer is reduced if the debtor country is running surpluses
(TBL >0),and is increased if the debtor country is running deficits. Third,
the transfer must be raised when the terms of trade deteriorates, i.e.
—dA/A
>0,by the percentage of the terms—of—trade deterioration times
the value of total imports. The total "loss" to the LDCs is measured by the sum
of these three effects.
In Table 19, we provide some calculations of di (or total loss) for
various policy changes. In order to make the calculations, we start with a
baseline scenario given at the bottom of the table. In particular, we need
values for TB, and the components of DEBTt, which are then—51-
Table 19: Effects of External Shocks on LDC Utility
(1919 $b)
Total
Loss due to Change in
Export Interest
Shock Year Loss Price TOT Rate


















































































Source: See text for method of decomposition, The baseline simulationassumes
the following quantities (19814 $bill),
Net
Trade Balance Imports Debt
19814 —10.5 3147,0 5914.8
1985 —10.9 3514.1 612.6
1986 —11.2 3614.7 631.0
1987 —11.6 375,7 6149.9—52—
multiplied by the price and interest rate changes. For instance, we assume that
LDC net debt rises from $595b to $650b ($198)4) between 198)4and1981. The trade
balance moves from —$lO.5b to —$ll.6b. The import bill rises from $31i.1th to
$3'r6b.
Accordingto the table, a U.S. fiscal expansion reduces LDC welfare by
$O.lbin the first year (i.e. requires a transfer of that amount as a
compensating variation). First, A1 falls, and since the LDCs have TBL <0along
the baseline path, the result is a favorable "export price" effect of $0.2b. In
addition, the terms of trade improves, reducing the required transfer by
$l.8b. Finally, interest rates rise, with drDt =$2.lbin 198)4. The net
transfer required is therefore —$0.2b$l.8b +$2.lb=$0.lb.Note that a
U.S. monetary expansion, as opposed to fiscal expansion, would raise LDC
welfare, since the dominating interest rate effect would be beneficial. As
shown in the table, a U.S. monetary contraction is very harmful, in terms of
interest rates initially, and subsequently also in terms of export prices and
the terms of trade.
It is important to recognize that a U.S. fiscal expansion is more
beneficial to the LDCs than an OECD fiscal expansion. This is despite the fact
that LDC debt is $denominated,and the OECD fiscal expansion causes both a
nominal and real dollar depreciation. In fact, as shown, an OECD fiscal
expansion lowers LDC welfare by $0.5b in the first year, whereas the same
stimulus from the U.S. reduces LDC welfare by $0.lh. The main differences are
that the OECD expansion raises AL while the U.S. expansion reduces it and the
terms of trade of LDCs improves more under the U.S. fiscal expansion. Even—53—
though the OECD expansion has much less effect on the U.S. real interest rate
than does the U.S. expansion, the terms of trade and export price effects
dominate the utility loss.
An OECD monetary contraction has less of a negative effect on the LDCs
because of the smaller effect on U.S. interest rates. The OECD decline in money
causes the dollar to depreciate, and actually reduces U.S. real interest rates.
The final set of numbers refers to the LDC loss in utility from
non—cooperative as opposed to cooperative policies between the U.S. and the
OECD. As we have already shown, non—cooperation induces a policy stance of
loose fiscal and tight monetary policies, and extremely high real and nominal
interest rates. We saw in Tables 17 and 18 that r98 is more than 5 percentage
points higher in the non.-cooperative regime. As seen in Table 19, this
translates into a welfare loss of $16.1b in l984, falling to $ll.3b in 1985, and
$llb in 1986.
It is important to reconcile the utility measurements of Table 19 with an
alternative view that holds the U.S. fiscal expansion to be beneficial to the
LDCs, by raising LDC exports. The calculations of Table 19 measure the
increased costs of imports plus debt servicing, due to changes in interest and
prices, for a given level of export volumes. Implicit in the calculation is the
assumption that changes in export volumes have no first—order utility effects.
Thus, even though the rise in GU stimulates LDC exports, that fact is given no
weight in the welfare calculation.
According to the standard trade measurement, the price of exports measures
the opportunity cost of exports, so that a $1 increase in exports (at given—54—
prices) reduces the production of other goods (e.g. non—tradeables or leisure)
by $1. Thus, changes in export volumes merely reflect a substitution of one
output for another, at equal social value on the margin.
If the LDC econoimj is underemployed, however, the change in exports need
not crowd out otherwise production (or leisure) of equal value. Indeed, if the 1DC
governments are other unable to stimulate their under—employed economies, and if
the value of leisure is zero, then each $1 increase in export volumes might
reflect a net increase of even more than $1 in welfare.
These considerations suggest a modified welfare measures such as
di =di+8ALd(C+C+C).Here 0 represents the fraction at which the rise in
export volumes is evaluated. We plan to explore measures such as di in further
work.
V.The Gains toaCoordinated Response tothe Shock
In this section we usethemodel to assess the potential gains to
coordinating policies between the US and OECD in response to an OPEC price shock
of the magnitude experienced in 1919. The model was recalibrated using data on
trade shares and asset stocks for 1919. These new trade and asset matrices are
given in Tables 20 and 21. Note that the ratio of OECD to US GDP is 1.88 in
1919 compared with 1.39 for 1983. Most of this difference is due to valuation
effects of an appreciating dollar.—55—




U.S. OECD LDC OPEC
U.S. —— 113.6 51.6 14,5
(.o'8) (.022) (.oo6)
OECD llo.'T —— i16.1 60.6
(.o'6) (.061) (.025)
LDC 53.3 119.9 53.5
(.022) (.050) (.022)
OPEC 41.3 118.8 11.5 ——
(.020) (.050) (.033)





US private — .019 — .o16
official .21 — — — —
OECD private — — - .026
official — — .395 — —
OPEC - - - - —
LDCs .032 .039 .006 .016 .015
We assume that the U.S. inherits an inflation rate of 9.8% and the OECD
inherits an inflation rate of 8%. The model is shocked with a rise in the price
of OPEC exports of 914% in 1919 (this is the change in the real U.S. price of—56—
SaudiOil between 1919(1) and 1980(1) given in TFSStatistics).The Objective
of the US and OECD governments is to reduce inflation and the output gap to zero
as set out in the section III.
In Tables 22 and 23 we compare the non—cooperative and cooperative
equilibria. Of course, these comparisons depend on a particular assumed utility
function in each country, and so they are not, strictly speaking, historical
simulations. In fact, the utility functions are probably a bit too
anti—inflationary in their implications to mimic the actual policies that were
undertaken. Nonetheless, we believe that the results give at least an order of
magnitude of the results to be achieved through more active policy coordination.
Noticethat in this section all results are in constant $1919.
As wefound above, the optimal policy mix in both regions in response to an
inflationary impulse is a sharp monetary contraction and a fiscal expansion to
offset the output decline. The policy mix for the U.S. is shown in Figure 14•
MU is cut by 18% in 1919 followedby a return to faster monetary growth by 1981.
Fiscal policy is extremely expansionary with the deficit rising by 7.5% of GDP.
The mix in the OECIJ is less extreme with a monetary contraction of 15% and a
fiscal expansion of 3.5% of OECD GDP (or 6.3% of US GDP). Given the assumed
parameters the dollar exchange rate appreciates 11% in 1979. The U.S. nominal
interest rate rises to 25.8% in 1979 (short—term rates in fact rose above
20 percent in 1980 in the U.S. but not to 25%).
Under a regime of cooperation, with the U.S. and OECD receiving equal
weight in overall utility, both the U.S. and the OECD reach higher levels of
interteniporal utility. In Figure 5 we show the optimal paths of U.S. monetary—57--
















12.)4 7.6 6.i )4.9
US INTEREST RATE D 20.8 i)4.)4 11.1 9.6
EXCHANGE RATE ($/E) % —11.0 —7.1 —2.1 1.8
OECD GDP —10.5 —6.9 —)4. —3.2
OECD INFLATION % 12.5 1•)4 3.0 2.0
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PRICE OF LDC EXPORTSIN$Us % 12.0 21.1 29.5 36.6
LDC TOT % —5.0 —)4.6 —)4.o —3.3
OPEC TOT )49.1 50.3 51.1 51.7—58—
Table 23: Effects of Cooperative Response to OPEC Shock













US INFLATION D 12.5 7.6 6.i 5.0
US INTEREST RATE D 14.2 11.7 9.6 8.0
EXCHANGE RATE ($/E) % —9.5 —5.6 —1.0 3.7'
OECD GDP % —io,6 —7.0 —4.7 —3.2
OECD INFLATION % 12.4 4.3 2.9 1.9
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PRICE OF LDC EXPORTSIN$US % 12.2 21.8 30.14 31.6
LDC TOT % —5.9 —5.0 3.5
OPEC TOT
.
1493 50.14 51.2 51.8—59—
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Figure 5: U.S. Macroeconomic Policy Under CoordinatedResponse to OPEC Price Shock
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Money Growth Fiscal Deficit (%ofGDP)—60—
andfiscal policy. The monetary contraction in the U.S. is cut by a third of
what it was under non—cooperation. Also the fiscal expansion is now only 2.2%
of U.S. GDP compared to 1.5% under noncooperation. Nominal interest rates in
the U.S. rise to 19.2% which is still a large rise but more than 6% less than under
non—cooperation. The dollar appreciation is also reduced to 9.5%.
Again we find a large gain for the LDCs from the move to cooperation
between the US and OECD. Cooperation reduces the loss in LDC real imports by i%
although it worsens the LDC terms of trade. The big gain for the LDCs is again
through the effects of lower interest rates and a less appreciated dollar on
debt repayments. in 1979 alone, cooperation would save the LDCs $9.3b in
interest repayments. The utility calculations that we developed in section IV
can again be used to measure the overall gain for the LDCs. Consider the
measure of gain to cooperation given in Table 2)4:
Table 2)4: Gains Due to Cooperation
(1919 $b) __________________________________
Gaindue to_______________
Year Total Gain Export Price TOTInterest Rate
1979 6.9 —0.1 -2.3 9.3
1980 3.7 —0.3 —1.0 5.1
1981 3.5 —O.)4 —07
1982 3.2 —0,5 0.5
The baseline siimilation assumes the following quantities (1979 $b):





VI.Impact of a Change in the U.S Fiscal/Monetary Mix
Inthis section we examine the implications of a shift in U.S. policy
towards smaller fiscal deficits and more expansionary monetary policy
commencing in l984. We consider two cases. The first is a sustained cut in
U.S. fiscal deficits of 2% of U.S GDP per year brought about by a cut in real
spending. MU is increased by a sustained i.i% to offset the contractionary
effect of the fiscal stance on real output (in the first year). The second
simulation is a gradual reduction of fiscal deficits of 1% of US. GDP in l98iL
and 2% in 1985 brought about by a cut in spending. We again choose a path for
monetary policy which offsets the initial impact of the fiscal policy on real
output. All results are presented as deviation from our assumed base path.
Sustained Change in the U.S. Fiscal Monetary Mix
The results for the sustained 2% (of U.S. GDP) cut in U.S. fiscal deficits
accompanied by a relaxation of monetary policy are shown in Table 25. These
results are presented as deviations from a baseline simulation. Our
approximation for monetary accomodation is simply a one step rise in the path of
MU, that approximately offsets the fiscal contraction in the firstyear.
U.S. GDP rises slightly in i98 but declines in subsequent periods because
monetary policy is not sufficiently expansionary in later years to offset the
contraction induced by fiscal policy. The change in policy mix has the expected
effect on the US interest rate, which falls by 1.8 percentage points in 198)4 and
continues to fall thereafter. By 1990 the reduction is 2.9% in the nominal
interest rate and 2.5% in the real rate. The U.S. current account improves by
$31.3b in 198)4 and remains improved. The U.S. dollar depreciates by 8.1% in—62—
Table 25:Effectsof a U.S. Fiscal Contraction and Monetary Expansion
198)4 198519861987
US GDP ($8)4) 0.2—0.8—1.1—1.1
US GDP ($814) $b 5.5—28.3—14)4.0—143.6
US INFLATION 0 0.50.50.1—0.2
US INTEREST RATE 0 —1.8—1.9—2.1—2.3
EXCHANGE RATE ($/E) 8.1 8.0 8.2 8.3
OECD GDP —1.8o.)4 0.8 1.5
OECD INFLATION —0.14—1.3—1.0 —0.14
OECD INTEREST RATE D —i.6—1.9—2.0 —1.9
LDC IMPORTS ($) 14.14 14.7 5.14 6.i
LDC IMPORTS ($) $b 15.0 16.1419.6 22.1
LDCIMPORTS (vol) —1.2—0.2 0.9 1.7
LDC EXPORTS ($) 2.1 2.3 2.93l
LDCEXPORTS ($) $b 6.8 7.110.011.8
LDC EXPORTS (vol) —2.3—1.7—1.0—0.7
LDC CA ($) % OF US GDP 0.0—0.1 0.0 0.0
LDC CA ($) $b —0.2)4.O—1.5 0.3
LDC IN ON DEBT ($) % OF US GOP —0.2—0.2—0.2—0.2
LDC IN ON DEBT ($) $b _7.)4-7.5—7.9—8.8
US CA ($) % OF US GDP 0.9 0.7 0.8 1.0
US CA ($) $b 31.327.932.5 38.14
LDC CAP GAIN ON DEBT ($) % OF US GDP 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
LDC CAP GAIN ON DEBT ($) $b 0.0 3.6 0.8—1.5
PRICE OF LDC EXPORTS IN $us 14.14 14.0 14.0 14.0
LDC TOT —1.2—0.8—0.5—0.3
OPEC TOT —0.14 0.0 0.14 0.6—63—
198)4 and stays weaker than in the base simulation. Because of the dollar
depreciation, inflation rises by a half percentage point in 198)4 and 1985.
Consider the impact on the rest of the world. As expected the U.S.policy
has a beggar thy neighbour impact on the OECD. OECD GDP fallsby 1.8% in 198)4
due to the appreciation of the ECU. The OECD recession is short—livedthough,
as falling world interest rates stimulate OECD domestic demand. OECD inflation
is also reduced by .14% in 198)4. From 1986 the OECD is in aposition of lower
inflation and higher output than under the base path.
The gains to the LDCs are more immediate. The depreciation of the dollar
and lower interest rates reduces the burden of the debt. This is offsetby a
deterioration in the terms of trade due to the initial contraction in OECD
demand for LDC goods. In Table 26 we calculate the gain in LDCutility using
the technique discussed in section IV.
























As this table illustrates the LDC gains increase over time as interest rates
continue to fall and the LDC terms of trade improve. Thus, even though the U.S.
GDP growth is reduced, the LDCs benefit according to our welfare criteria.—64--
Gradual change in the US Fiscal/Monetary Mix
The second U.S. policy switch that we consider consists of a 1% (of U.S.
GDP) reduction inthereal fiscal deficit inl98and a 2% cut from 1985 onwards
(with a corresponding cut in real spending). We also assume a monetary path
which dampens the contractionary effect of fiscal policy on real output. In
this case we assume no change in MU relative to baseline in l984 and a rise of
2%, 3%, 5.3%. 6.1%. 6.8% and.0%with 1% maintained relative to baseline in all
subsequent years from 1990. The results are shown in Table 27.
It is interesting to note that despite the fiscal cut and no change in
monetary policy in 198)4, U.S. GDP rises in 198)4. This is the result of the
forward looking behaviour in the model. Agents are aware of the future fiscal
contraction and monetary expansion. The future exchange rate depreciation is
brought into the present by a shift out of dollars into ECU in anticipation of
the depreciation of the dollar. The effect of the large U.S. depreciation on
stimulating foreign demand for U.S. goods is larger than the direct effect of
the fiscal contraction. This seems to occur because part of the exchange rate
change reflects anticipated spending changes which do not appear until 1985.
Thelarger depreciation is reflected in higher U.S. inflation. Interest rates
also rise by.6% initiallydue to the increase in inflation, but quickly decline
from1985 as the anticipated fiscal cut occurs. The U.S. current account
improves in 198)4 and continues to improve. The initial gain in U.S. GDP from
the higher exchange rate depeciation is reflected in a larger initial loss in
OECD GDP. Again it is only 2 years before OECD GDP has returned to its base
path level.—65—
Table21: Gradual U.S. Fiscal Contraction/Monetary Expansion
19814198519861987
US GDP ($814) 0.6 0.14—0.5—1.0
US GDP ($814) $b 23.013.7 —20.2 —140.5
US INFLATION D 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.7
US INTEREST RATE D 0.6—0.8—2.1—3.8
EXCHAJGE RATE ($/E) 11.213.916.3i8.i
OECD GDP % —2.14—1.1 0.5 1.8
OECD INFLATION —0.5—1.8—1.7 _1.1
OECD INTEREST RATE D —2.1—3.0—3.5—3.6
LDC IMPORTS ($) 5.14 8.010.713.3
LDC IMPORTS ($) $b 18.528.038.7 149.8
LDC IMPORTS (vol) —2.14—1.0 0.7 2.5
LDCEXPORTS ($) 14.9 5.8 7.1 8.i
LDC EXPORTS ($) $b 15.7'19.1 214.2 28.14
LDC EXPORTS (vol) —2.0—2.1—1.9—1.8
LDC CA ($) % OFUS GDP 0.0—0.2—0.2—0.2
LDC CA ($) $b —0.9—7.8—8.9—7.9
LDCIN ON DEBT ($) % OFUS GOP —0.0—0.2—0.3 —0.14
LDC IN ON DEBT ($) $b —1.5—6.14 —11.0 —17.0
US CA ($) % OFUS GOP 0.9 1.1 1.14 1.7
USCA ($) $b 314.6 140.3 52.1467.2
LDC CAP GAIN ON DEBT ($) % OFUS GDP 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1
LDC CAP GAIN ON DEBT ($) $b 0.0 6.1 6.14 14.7
PRICE OF LDC EXPORTS IN $us 6.9 7.9 9.0 9.9
LDC TOT —1.0—1.0—0.9—0.9
OPEC TOT —0.7—0.2 0.14 0.9—66—
Inthis case, the LDC terms of trade deterioration exceeds the interest
rate effect in the first year of the policy change, so that LDC welfare in 198)4
actually falls. However, from 1985 onward, the large benefits from lower U.S.
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198)4 —2.6 —0.7 1.5
1985 2.1 —0.8 —3.i 6.
1986 7.0 —0.8 11.2
1981 13.2 —0.8 l7'.)4
As can be seen from the results of this section the effects of the change
in U.S. fiscal/monetary mix depend importantly on the timing of the policy
changes. An anticipated reduction in future fiscal deficits can initially
reduce OECD and LDC welfare through the effect on the current exchange rate.
However, the gains to the LDCs from lower world interest rates emerge quickly.
VII. Conclusion
We have produced a small—scale model of LDC—OECD macroeconomic
interactions, that highlights the importance of OECD macroeconomic policies for
the external trade and financing of developing countries. The model allows us
to distinguish the effects of monetary versus fiscal policies, as well as—67—
policies in the U.S. versus the rest of the OECD, The key stock—flow
relationships are carefully observed, and expectations in the asset markets are
rational.
Given the objectives of macroeconomic policy that we specify, we highlight
an aspect of the gains to coordinating policies between the U.S. and the rest of
the OECD not previously remarked upon. That is the substantial gains to the
less developed countries which can emerge from coordination among the developed
countries. We have shown that in inflationary periods, non—cooperative policies
in the developed countries lead to high world interest rates which may be
reduced, to the benefit of the LDCs, by successful coordination.
The analysis in this paper can be usefully extended in several directions.
In future work we plan to estimate more of the structural equations although we
feel that the parameters we choose in this paper represent a broad consensus of
other econometric results. It is also important to examine the sensitivity of
the results to changes in these parameters. Another useful extension would be
to model the internal structure of the LDCs and to get a measure of the welfare
effects of various policies for individual countries within the LDCs. The
welfare measure that we developed in this paper could be modified to allow for
the presence of unemployed factors in the LDCs.—68—
Appen dix
Policy Multipliers from the DRI, MCM and EPA Models
Tables Al—A9 outline the multipliers for monetary and fiscal policy in the
DPI (Data Resources, Inc.), MCM(FederalReserve Board Multicountry) and EPA
(Japanese Economic Planning Agency) models. These provide a useful benchmark
for comparison with the multipliers presented in Tables 12 and 13 in the text.
1.Fiscal Multipliers
The multipliers for fiscal policy are shown in Tables Al to A4. The impact
multipliers for GNP in these ndels range from 1.2 to 2.0 with the three year
average multiplier ranging from .83 to 1.9. These compare with an impact
multiplier of .8 and a three year average multiplier of .8i in our model. The
smaller multiplier we find is not surprising given the importance of portfolio
adjustments and greater flexibility of the exchange rate in our model. The
exchange rate appreciation of 3.5% in our model is substantially greater than in
the larger models and is partly reflected in a larger decline in the U.S.
current account. The responses of other variables to a fiscal expansion are
broadly consistent with those found in the larger models.
2.Monetary Multipliers
The monetary policy multipliers are outlined in Tables A5—A9. A monetary
stimulus has a smaller impact effect on GNP in the larger models than we find.
These is also a wide divergence of results in the larger models for the monetary—69—
shocks although the shocks are only approximately consistent across models. In
DEla monetary stimulus changes GNP by twice the amount found in the MOM and EPA
models, with impact multipliers of .8,.3, and .Lrespectively compared with 1.1
inour model. The three year average multipliers for GNP are .inEPA, .8 in
DEl and .6 in MCMwhichcompares with .7 in our model. A monetary expansion
(contraction) also stimulates (dampens) GNP for a longer period in the larger
models with interest rates remaining below (above) the base path for a longer
period.—10--
Table Al: Fiscal Policy Multipliers for the MCMModel
1% GNP(77:l)
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uscpi % .0 .3 .6
US INTEREST RATE D .7 1.9 2.0

















Table A2:Fiscal PolicyMultipliersforthe EPA Model
Fiscal Policy: Sustainedincrease ingovt spending1% GNP(76:l)











us ci % .6 1.4 2.1
US INTEREST RATE D 1.0 1.4 1.7



















Table A3: Fiscal Policy Multipliers for the DRI Model
Fiscal Policy: Sustained increase in govt spending =1%GNP(8)-t:l)
Ml accommodating
Variable 198)4 1985 1986
US GNP ($12) l.4 1.5 1.5
US GNP ($12) $bl 21.9 25.1 25.)4
us cpi .2 .5 .8
US INTEREST RATE D .3 .6
EXCHANGE RATE($/E) -.2 -.)4 -.6
US TRADE BAL $bl —1.7 —3.7 —5.0
US TB/GNP .0 —.1 —.1
US CURRENT A/C BAL $bl —1.6 —3.5 —)4.9
US CA/GNP .0 -.1 -.1
Ml .5 .8 1.0
M3 .0 .0 .0
Table A4: Fiscal Policy Multipliers for the DRI Model
Fiscal Policy: Sustained increase in govt spending =1%GNP(81L:1)
Ml non—accommodating
Variable 198)4 1985 1986
US GNP ($72) 1.2 1.0 .7
US GNP ($72) $bl 19.Lt 16.7 12.0
US CPI .1 .3
US INTEREST RATE D 1.1 1.3 1.7
EXCHANGE RATE($/E) —.8 —2.0 —3.5
US TRADE BAL $bl -.9 -1.8 —2.9
US TB/GNP .0 .0 .0
US CURRENT A/C BAL $bl —.7 —1.5 —2.7
US CA/GNP .0 .0 .0
Ml .0 .0 .0
M3 —.6 —1.3 —1.9—72—
Table A5: Monetary Policy Multipliers for the MCM Model
Monetary Policy: Sustained 200 point decrease in US Discount Rate
Variable 1917 1918 1979
US GNP ($72) % .3 .8 .7
US GNP ($72) $bl 4.1 11.5 10.4
us ci .1 .2 .4
US INTEREST RATE D —1.2 —.9 —.6
EXCHANGE RATE($/E) 1.0 1.1 1.0












Table A6: Monetary Policy Multipliersfor the EPA Model
Monetary Policy: Sustained 200 point increase in USDiscount Rate
Variable 1976
US GNP ($72) —.3






us ci —.1 —.3 —.4
US INTEREST RATE D .5 .2 .2
EXCHANGE RATE($/E) —.7 —1.0 —1.2












Table Al: Monetary Policy Multipliers for the EPA Model
Monetary Policy: Sustained i% fall in Ml
Variable 1916 1917 1918
US GNP ($72) —.4





us cpi —.1 —.3 -.4
US INTEREST RATE D .6 .2 .2
EXCHANGE RATE($/E) —.9 —1.2 —1.2












Table A8: Monetary Policy Multipliersfor the DRI Model
Monetary Policy: Sustained 200 point decrease in USDiscount Rate
Variable 1984 1985 1986
US GNP ($72) .1





us ci .0 .1 .2
US INTEREST RATE D -.4 -.2 .0
EXCHANGE RATE($/E) .3 .5 .6












Ml .2 .2 .2Table A9: Monetary Policy Multipliers
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